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Introduction
Each year, states spend substantive monetary resources on 
the military in terms of troops, arms, other equipment and 
so forth; according to the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), countries invested ca. 2.5% of 
the world’s GDP (gross domestic product) in 2012, which 
comprised about US$ 1.753 trillion in that year. This cor-
responds to the GDP of Canada, the 11th largest economy 
in the world. Despite a decrease by 0.5% in real terms in 
2012 as compared to 2011 (which was the first drop since 
1998), the world’s military expenditure remains at histori-
cally high levels and is still larger than the peak figures we 
observed towards the end of the Cold War.
The amount of money allocated to the military has 
important implications for national, regional and global sta-
bility, and has sparked an intense debate on the military 
build-up in post-conflict societies, and on whether and to 
what extent military spending affects a state’s economic 
growth (e.g., Aizenman and Glick, 2006; Alptekin and 
Levine, 2011; Collier and Hoeffler, 2006; Dunne 
and Smith, 2010; Dunne et al., 2005; Heo, 2010; Kollias 
and Paleologou, 2013; Pieroni, 2009). Countries also vary 
considerably in the amount of resources they devote to their 
armed forces. For example, the military burden varies from 
0% (e.g., Costa Rica) to more than 14% of GDP in times of 
peace (e.g., Saudi Arabia), while even a nation’s entire 
GDP may be used for the military in times of war (e.g., 
Kuwait).
In light of these patterns, another key issue pertains to 
the determinants of military spending. In general, the litera-
ture identified a series of statistically significant results for 
a range of economic, political and security-related varia-
bles (see, e.g., Albalate et al., 2012; Dunne and Perlo-
Freeman, 2003; Dunne et al., 2008; Goldsmith, 2003; 
Nordhaus et al., 2012). To the best of our knowledge, how-
ever, the existent work has paid less attention to assessing 
variables’ ability to predict and forecast military spending. 
As long as the predictive power of these factors and the 
underlying theoretical model on the demand for military 
spending (see, e.g., Smith, 1995) remains ambiguous, little 
guidance is given to forecast the defence budget of indi-
vidual countries. In fact, most existent research on this 
topic does not explicitly address the question of whether we 
have reliable models for predicting and forecasting levels 
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of military spending (see Ward et al., 2010). All this is even 
more remarkable as the validity of policies based on empir-
ical models on states’ behaviour has been the subject of 
several recent debates in other fields of international rela-
tions (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 2011; Clayton and 
Gleditsch, 2013; Choucri and Robinson, 1978; Gleditsch 
and Ward, 2013; Goldstone et al., 2010; O’Brian, 2010; 
Schneider et al., 2010, 2011; Ward et al., 2010).
Hypothesis testing that ignores out-of-sample heuristics 
faces the inherent risk of fitting to a specific sample’s idio-
syncrasies, rather than identifying stable structural relation-
ships between military spending and its determinants (see 
Ward et al., 2010). In fact, if a model explains the relation-
ship between defence spending and some explanatory fac-
tors fairly well in-sample, we merely assume that it also 
performs well when presented with new data (i.e., out-of-
sample). Yet, if the model only gives a description of this 
relationship in the original data set without capturing 
underlying causal relations, the chances to make correct 
and useful predictions with new data are likely to be under-
mined (see Beck et al., 2000; Ward et al., 2010).
In order to demonstrate how predictions of military 
spending can be derived from a theoretical model, we use 
one of the most recent models on military spending by 
Nordhaus et al. (2012) and examine the predictive power of 
its main explanatory variables via in-sample predictions, 
out-of-sample forecasts and Bayesian model averaging. 
This approach allows us to compare several complemen-
tary ways for assessing the predictive power of variables. 
To this end, the paper provides guidelines for prediction 
exercises in general using three different approaches that 
jointly acknowledge in-sample and out-of-sample heuris-
tics. More substantially, however, we study whether ex-
ante information about several explanatory variables can 
improve our ability to predict future levels of military 
spending. The findings emphasize that previous levels of 
military spending as well as a country’s institutional and 
economic characteristics particularly improve our ability to 
predict future levels of investment in the military. Variables 
pertaining to the international security environment also 
matter, but – perhaps surprisingly – seem less important. 
The results additionally show that the new model, which 
drops weak predictors, is not only more parsimonious, but 
also slightly more accurate than the model’s original speci-
fication. We conclude by identifying those countries that 
perform best/worst in this forecasting research and by dis-
cussing what suggested explanatory factors can be consid-
ered ex-ante by policymakers as opposed to features that 
are only available to the research ex-post.
Data and empirical strategy
We rely on one baseline model that was originally pre-
sented by Nordhaus et al. (2012). These scholars use panel 
data for 1952–2000, while their data on military 
expenditures are supplied by the SIPRI and the Correlates 
of War (COW) project. Since the SIPRI does not provide 
data before 1988, Nordhaus et al. (2012) compiled COW 
data from 1952 to 1987, which were then combined with 
SIPRI data from 1988 to 2000.1 Spending data are con-
verted into constant US$ measured with purchasing power 
parity and log-transformed. The baseline model in Nordhaus 
et al. (2012) is specified as follows:
Military Spending ln P GDP ln
Spending Foes ln
it
MID
( ) = ( )
( )
α β
γ
δ
∧
+
+
+ Spending Friends ln
Democracy
Lagged Dependent Variable
( )
+
+ +
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µ 
where Military Spending (ln) is the log of military 
spending and Pit
MID∧ pertains to the ex-ante probability of a 
country being involved in a fatal militarized interstate dis-
pute (MID). This latter variable is estimated using a stand-
ard liberal-realist model of interstate conflict, which 
includes information on a country’s political, economic and 
military characteristics, as well as dyadic features such as 
distance or the level of bilateral trade.2 GDP (ln) is the log 
of the real GDP, and is expected to be positive as larger 
countries usually require larger defence forces. Spending 
Foes (ln) and Spending Friends (ln) belong to the log of the 
weighed defence spending of enemies and allies, respec-
tively; these two items are meant to capture the effect of 
arms races with enemies (i.e., the action–reaction explana-
tion of military expenditure) and the spillover benefits 
accruing from the expenditure of allies. Democracy is the 
Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004), which reflects 
that autocratic systems invest more in the military appara-
tus than democracies. Finally, there is also the lagged 
dependent variable, while  is the error term.
We implement two changes in this estimation strategy. 
Firstly, using Pit
MID∧ in a model ultimately meant for pre-
dictions and forecasts would imply that we rely on an ex-
ante prediction to generate further ex-ante predictions. 
Hence, something uncertain is used to produce other uncer-
tain point estimates, and this item discards much of the 
variation in the sub-indicators. In order to address this 
shortcoming, we decided to disaggregate Pit
MID∧ and use the 
sub-components of this indicator in our models. This also 
allows us to assess which of these components are more 
accurate in predicting military spending and, hence, are 
more important. As indicated above (Nordhaus et al., 2012: 
492f), these sub-components comprise (1) a dyadic item on 
the time elapsed in years since the last involvement of both 
states in a fatal MID, (2) two variables on both states’ 
regime type as measured by the Polity score (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2004), (3) a dyadic trade-to-GDP ratio, (4) a dyadic 
contiguity variable, (5) the distance between two states in a 
dyad, (6) a dyadic GDP ratio used as a dyadic 
(1)
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power measure, (7) a dyadic variable on joint alliance 
membership, (8) a monadic measure on a state’s GDP rela-
tive to the world’s GDP and (9) the number of states in the 
international system. Except for the distance and GDP ratio 
variables, which are truly dyadic, we transformed all these 
items into monadic measures, leading to the final baseline 
model specification:
Military Spending ln Peace Years Democracy
Trade GDP
Co
( ) =
/
α β
γ
δ
+
+
+ ntiguity Allies
GDP World GDP
Number of States in System
G
+
+
+
+
η
θ
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( ) ( )
( )
+
+
+
ϖ
ν
µ ndent Variable + 
with Military Spending (ln) is the log of military spend-
ing, Peace Years counts the number of years since a state 
was involved in any fatal MID with any state, Democracy 
is the monadic Polity score introduced above, Trade/GDP 
is a country’s trade openness (i.e., the sum of imports and 
exports divided by GDP), Contiguity counts the number of 
land- or sea-based contiguous states of a country as defined 
by the COW project, Allies counts the number of alliances 
a state has in a given year, GDP/World captures a state’s 
GDP in relation to the world’s GDP in a given year and 
Number of States in System simply counts the number of 
existing countries in a given year, while the last variables 
have been discussed for Equation (1) above.
The second change we implement pertains to the states 
included in the sample. In the context of the following pre-
diction and forecasting exercises, we also will be assessing 
the prediction/forecasting accuracy for individual states. 
For this, however, we need to estimate country-individual 
models and, thus, we drop all countries for our final data 
sample that have fewer than 10 observations.3 The coun-
tries covered by our data drop to 141 as a result.
Table 1 reports the estimates of three different specifica-
tions of Equation (2): we first run the model without the 
lagged dependent variable and with robust standard errors. 
Afterwards, we include the lagged dependent variable in 
Model 2 and, finally, we use standard errors clustered on 
states in Model 3 to take into account intra-group depend-
encies. To facilitate the interpretation of the main results in 
Table 1, we also plot the variables’ coefficient estimates 
and their 90% confidence intervals in Figure 1.
The results in Table 1 and Figure 1 essentially mirror the 
findings in Nordhaus et al. (2012) and are in line with the 
theoretical expectations developed in the literature. Firstly, 
past military spending is a major determinant of current 
military investments. Secondly, the log of real GDP, the 
proxy for the economic size and power of a state, displays 
the expected positive sign and has a comparatively large 
coefficient. Thirdly, a country’s investment in defense does 
not appear to be responsive to the expenditure of friendly 
nations, but seems to be affected by potential adversaries’ 
spending. Finally, the higher the GDP/World GDP ratio for 
a country, the higher its investment in the military. All other 
variables, while being mostly statistically significant 
according to conventional levels, display coefficients that 
are rather small in substance.
Note, however, that Ward et al. (2010) forcefully remind 
us that empirical results in the form of regression coeffi-
cients may not tell us much about the actual influence of 
specific explanatory variables on military spending: policy 
prescriptions cannot be based on statistical summaries of 
probabilistic models. Thus, we now proceed with in-sample 
predictions, out-of-sample forecasts and Bayesian model 
averaging. Moving from empirical analyses based on statis-
tical significance to prediction/forecasting serves two pur-
poses. Firstly, it allows us to discriminate among 
explanatory factors more accurately according to their pre-
dictive power. Secondly, it offers a more solid scientific 
basis for assessing future levels of military spending, which 
is highly relevant from a policy perspective. In the follow-
ing, we focus on the third model specification in Table 1 as 
it appears more conservative than Models 1 and 2.
In-sample prediction
How effective is the model in predicting military spending 
in-sample? Put differently, how accurate are the “condi-
tional statements about a phenomenon for which the 
researcher actually has data, i.e., the outcome variable has 
been observed?” (Bechtel and Leuffen, 2010: 311). To 
assess this, we compare the predicted yearly median levels 
of military spending using the estimated parameters from 
Model 3 with the truly observed levels. The results are 
depicted in Figure 2: the model fails to predict the military 
build-up shortly after the Korean War (1954), underpredicts 
values toward the end of the 1990s, and overpredicts a peak 
near the end of the Cold War. Still, this figure demonstrates 
that the predicted values fit the time points of the actually 
observed data reasonably well.
To assess the accuracy of this prediction more thor-
oughly, we use two goodness-of-fit measures: the mean 
squared prediction error (MSPE) and Theil’s U (Theil et al., 
1966), which (unlike the MSPE) does not depend on the 
scale of the data (see also Bechtel and Leuffen, 2010). 
Theil’s U is the square root of the ratio between the sum of 
squared prediction errors of the baseline model (i.e., Model 
3) and the sum of squared prediction errors of a naive 
model, that is, a “no-change prediction” where the level of 
military spending in t–1 fully corresponds to the level of 
military spending in t. The closer the MPSE is to 0, the 
more accurate is the model in making predictions. 
Moreover, if Theil’s U is larger than 1, the model actually 
performs worse than the naive model; values for Theil’s U 
(2)
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smaller than 1 indicate that the “theoretically informed 
model” performs better than the naive specification. For 
our baseline model, the MPSE is 0.0879, while Theil’s U is 
at 0.9643. Ultimately, therefore, the specifications used in 
Model 3 perform well in predicting military spending.
Firstly, however, it remains to be seen how accurately 
this model predicts military spending when moving to the 
“harder” test of an out-of-sample forecast. Put another way, 
what is the model’s predictive power when trying to cor-
rectly predict military spending that is not “within the very 
same set of data that was used to generate the models in the 
first place” (Ward et al., 2010: 8)? Secondly, do some pre-
dictors of Model 3 not contribute to the overall predictive 
power of this model – perhaps despite their statistical sig-
nificance and the theoretical importance assigned to the 
sub-indicators of Pit
MID∧ by Nordhaus et al. (2012) – and 
may therefore be dropped from the estimation? In order to 
address both questions, we use out-of-sample forecasting 
and Bayesian model averaging, the issues considered next.
Out-of-sample forecast
For the out-of-sample forecast, we use a four-fold cross-
validation quasi-experimental setup that was repeated 10 
times (Ward et al., 2010) – either for the baseline model or 
a model that omits an explanatory variable from the esti-
mation. Ward et al. (2010: 370) describe this approach in 
more detail than we can possibly do here due to space limi-
tations. In short, however, this cross-validation randomly 
divides our 5684 observations we used for Model 3 into 
four segments. We then use three segments to estimate the 
parameters, while the fourth segment, also called the “test 
set” (Ward et al., 2010: 370), is retained for assessing the 
predictive power of the the baseline model or a model that 
omits one of the predictors at each time on the pooled sub-
sets. We drop one independent variable from the model at 
a time in order to estimate the effect that this specific vari-
able has on the model’s ability to make out-of-sample fore-
casts. Again, we calculated the MPSE and Theil’s U for 
measuring the predictive power, for which we then present 
the average values over the 10 repetitions.
Table 2 gives an overview of the baseline model’s out-of-
sample forecasting power and the individual contribution 
Peace Years
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Trade/GDP
Contiguity
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GDP/World GDP
Number of States in System
GDP (ln)
Spending Foes (ln)
Spending Friends (ln)
Lagged Dependent Variable
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Figure 1. Coefficient plot of Table 1. Note: horizontal bars 
pertain to 90% confidence interval; the vertical dashed line 
signifies a coefficient value of 0.
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Figure 2. Median levels of military spending: predicted (dashed 
line) and actual (solid line) values.
Table 1. The determinants of national military spending – 
baseline model (see also Nordhaus et al., 2012).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Peace years −0.001 −0.000 −0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Democracy −0.037 −0.003 −0.003
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Trade/GDP 0.071 0.005 0.005
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.005)
Contiguity 0.052 0.003 0.003
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
Allies 0.041 −0.000 −0.000
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.002)
GDP/world GDP 1.691 0.281 0.281
 (0.550) (0.123) (0.148)
Number of states in system −0.006 −0.001 −0.001
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP (ln) 1.018 0.072 0.072
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Spending foes (ln) 0.486 0.040 0.040
 (0.042) (0.014) (0.014)
Spending Friends (ln) 0.063 0.001 0.001
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.006)
Lagged dependent variable 0.929 0.929
 (0.010) (0.015)
Observations 5684 5684 5684
R2 0.813 0.981 0.981
Standard errors in parentheses; standard errors clustered on country in 
Model 3.
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each of the variables makes. These contributions are meas-
ured in terms of the difference between the average value of 
the baseline model’s MSPE or Theil’s U values on one hand 
and, on the other hand, the corresponding average goodness-
of-fit measure’s value calculated for a model that discards 
that particular item. For example, excluding Peace Years 
from the baseline model leads to an increase in Theil’s U 
from 0.9675 to 0.9678. Therefore, Peace Years does con-
tribute to the model’s overall prediction and forecasting 
power by 0.0003 units according to Theil’s U. Similarly, 
leaving out this variable induces an increase of 0.0001 in 
terms of the MSPE. The contribution of Peace Years to the 
model’s forecasting power is therefore given, yet is small in 
substance, and this mirrors the findings for most other pre-
dictors. Five variables constitute an exception to this, 
though, as these seem to be major contributors to the mod-
el’s forecasting power: Democracy, Number of States in 
System, GDP (ln), Spending Foes (ln) and the lagged 
dependent variable. Overall, the four-fold cross-validation 
suggests that these five contribute the most to the overall 
predictive power of the baseline model taken from Nordhaus 
et al. (2012).
Two additional conclusions can be derived from these 
findings. Firstly, none of the included predictors in Model 3 
actually worsens the forecasting power; that is, neither 
Theil’s U nor the MSPE decrease when leaving out an item 
from the model specification and running the four-fold 
cross-validation. While this may constitute “good news”, 
note that there are several variables that are unlikely to have 
any impact on the forecasting power at all. Secondly, those 
five variables that our out-of-sample analysis highlights as 
the most important factors for predicting and forecasting 
future national military expenditure largely pertain to the 
economic size of a country and its regime type. Most of the 
proxies for the international security environment, which is 
treated as one of the core factors in, for example, Nordhaus 
et al. (2012), are unlikely to matter – the military spending 
of foes and the total number of states in the international 
system are the only exceptions. This highlights (again) not 
only the importance of going beyond statistically signifi-
cant coefficients, but also that it was crucial to actually dis-
aggregate the MID involvement indicator used by Nordhaus 
et al. (2012).
Bayesian model averaging
The four-fold cross-validation approach in the previous 
section does not necessarily suggest that one should drop 
any variable from our baseline model in order to maximize 
accuracy in predictions and forecasts; however, some vari-
ables hardly make any contribution at all to the forecasting 
power and may therefore be dropped, even if only for effi-
ciency reasons. To further examine this issue, we imple-
ment a final methodological approach that similarly 
addresses both model and parameter uncertainty: Bayesian 
model averaging (Amini and Parmeter, 2011; Fernández 
et al., 2001; Ley and Steel, 2009; Montgomery and Nyhan, 
2010; Raftery et al., 1997; Steel, 2014; Zeugner, 2012). A 
detailed and formal overview of this method is given in the 
provided references. In brief, however, Bayesian model 
averaging deals with the uncertainty about one model 
specification – one specification that may be only one out 
of many. Inferences based on one model only, however, 
might be limited and, thus, they should rather reflect the 
ambiguity about the model. Bayesian model averaging 
addresses this by considering all possible combinations of 
variables (in our case, there is a model space of 2048 differ-
ent models, as we have 11 predictors) in order to increase 
model fit, that is, “all inference is averaged over models, 
using the corresponding posterior model probabilities as 
weights” (Fernández et al., 2001: 564), via goodness-of-fit 
measures such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
or the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), while taking 
the entire predictive distribution into account (Raftery, 
Table 2. Out-of-sample forecasting power.
Excluded variable Mean U Mean MSPE ∆U ∆MSPE
None (baseline model) 0.9675 0.0885 – –
Peace years 0.9678 0.0886 0.0003 0.0001
Democracy 0.9704 0.0891 0.0029 0.0005
Trade/GDP 0.9675 0.0885 0.0001 0.0000
Contiguity 0.9677 0.0886 0.0003 0.0001
Allies 0.9677 0.0886 0.0002 0.0000
GDP/world GDP 0.9675 0.0885 0.0000 0.0000
Number of states in system 0.9692 0.0888 0.0018 0.0003
GDP (ln) 0.9823 0.0913 0.0149 0.0027
Spending foes (ln) 0.9692 0.0888 0.0018 0.0003
Spending friends (ln) 0.9675 0.0885 0.0001 0.0000
Lagged dependent variable 3.0286 0.8674 2.0611 0.7789
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1995; Steel, 2014). To this end, we first assign a prior to the 
model space, while the data will then lead to a posterior 
probability, which can be used to identify the “best” model 
that is usually the one with the highest posterior probability. 
Bayesian model averaging then uses these posterior model 
probabilities as weights in order to mix over models (Steel, 
2014: 4). Ultimately, we are thus able to calculate posterior 
inclusion probabilities (PIPs), that is, the sum of posterior 
model probabilities for all models where a covariate was 
included (Amini and Parmeter, 2011), for entire models or 
single predictors in order to determine, in turn, which vari-
ables should be incorporated in a model and which ones can 
safely be ignored.
Figure 3 summarizes the predictors’ PIPs for five differ-
ent specifications, that is, uniform, Bayesian (or) Risk 
Inflation Criterion (BRIC), fixed, PIP and random, of the 
Bayesian model averaging using the BMS package in R 
(Zeugner, 2012). These five specifications essentially per-
tain to alternative settings of the (unit information) priors 
that we assign to the 2048 models or the different predic-
tors ex-ante. This is important, as the use of different prior 
assumptions can lead to very different results (Steel, 2014: 
2). In more detail, apart from the BRIC specification, all 
setups rely on Zellner’s g-prior as the unit information 
prior, while uniform has a uniform model prior, fixed has a 
binomial model prior, PIP assigns a prior inclusion prob-
ability of 10% for the lagged dependent variable and 50% 
for all other covariates4 and random assigns a beta-bino-
mial model prior. Finally, BRIC has a uniform model prior, 
but relies on a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sam-
pling technique, that is, “the birth-death sampler” in our 
case (Zeugner, 2012: 11), and ensures that the posterior 
model probabilities asymptotically either behave like the 
BRIC (Zeugner, 2012: 11).
The results in Figure 3 are highly robust across prior 
specifications and shed more light on the findings we 
obtained from the four-fold cross-validation. Specifically, 
Democracy, Number of States in System, GDP (ln) and the 
lagged dependent variable are characterized by PIPs that 
are close to 1.00, meaning that the sum of posterior model 
probabilities for all models wherein these predictors were 
included is consistently at or close to 100%. Moreover, 
Spending Foes (ln) and Peace Years have PIPs that are on 
average higher than 0.50, that is, the sum of posterior 
model probabilities for all models wherein these predictors 
were included is consistently at or close to 50%. All other 
predictors display PIPs that are, sometimes quite substan-
tially well, below 0.50 and we thus drop these for the final 
model. Interestingly, apart from Spending Friends (ln), 
dyadic versions of all variables we drop for the final model 
are actually included in Pit
MID∧ , the ex-ante probability of a 
country being involved in a MID (Nordhaus et al., 2012). 
This highlights one more time the importance of disaggre-
gating this variable and going beyond Nordhaus et al. 
(2012)
Discussion and conclusion
In light of the previous sections, we re-estimated the base-
line model while leaving out the weakest predictors, that is, 
Contiguity, GDP/World GDP, Trade/GDP, Spending 
Friends (ln) and Allies. Afterwards, we performed another 
round of four-fold cross-validations that we repeated again 
10 times (Ward et al., 2010) – either for the original base-
line model or the new model that now omits the five weak-
est predictors. When assessing the predictive power of the 
latter specification, both the MSPE and Theil’s U should 
have lower values than the original model if the new, and 
arguably more parsimonious model, is more powerful in 
predicting and forecasting future values of military spend-
ing. Table 3 summarizes our findings. This table clearly 
shows that the newly specified, alternative baseline model, 
which omits five predictors of the original baseline model, 
is not only more parsimonious, but also slightly more accu-
rate than the model’s original specification: the MSPE is 
lower by −0.0001, while Theil’s U is −0.0005 units smaller 
than the original baseline model’s value.
To conclude, we assessed whether important drivers of 
military expenditure put forward by the existent literature 
allow us to predict and forecast future levels of national 
investment in the military. We focused on a recent model by 
Nordhaus et al. (2012) by using data on 141 countries in 
1952–2000. Our results show that most of the explanatory 
variables perform relatively well in the out-of-sample pre-
diction and the Bayesian model averaging.
Testing the validity of existing theoretical accounts has 
important implications for theory development and can also 
offer significant benefits for policymakers in terms of 
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Figure 3. Bayesian model averaging – posterior inclusion 
probabilities.
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effectively allocating scarce resources to the many areas of 
government spending. Specifically, our research finds that 
previous levels of military spending as well as a country’s 
institutional and economic characteristics particularly 
improve our ability to predict future levels of investment in 
the military. Variables pertaining to the international secu-
rity environment also matter, but seem less important. Given 
that most, if not all, of the best predictors we identified are 
either (largely) time-invariant or known ex-ante, we strongly 
believe that our work helps scholars and policymakers alike 
to foresee states’ military expenditures more accurately.
In light of this, using the new model, we also assess the 
prediction and forecasting power for individual countries. 
This gives us a more accurate idea of where the “good” 
predictions come from and whether the fairly high levels of 
prediction/forecasting accuracy are driven by particular 
states. It is our hope that this also increases the policy rele-
vance of our research. To this end, we use the new model 
specifications for a sample that comprises one out of all 141 
states only, assessed the prediction power via Theil’s U and 
the MSPE, and repeated this exercise for all countries in 
our data. Tables 4 and 5 display our findings as we sum-
marize the “top-five” and “worst-five” cases, respectively, 
in terms of prediction accuracy.
While several conclusions can be derived from these final 
tables, we would like to highlight two of them. Firstly, despite 
some exceptions, most of the “top-five” countries are fairly 
well developed, have a relatively high economic power, and 
are democracies. Apparently, these characteristics line up 
well with our strongest predictors identified above and, hence, 
facilitate accurate forecasts. Similarly, most of the “worst-
five” states lack these characteristics, although exceptions do 
exist here as well. Secondly, somewhat surpirisingly, the 
United Kingdom is one of the best predictive cases according 
to the MSPE, but belongs to the worst cases in terms of Theil’s 
U. While this is arguably driven by some differences for cal-
culating these statistics, also note that Theil’s U for the United 
Kingdom still is well below 1.00.
Ultimately, we believe that future work should ensure that 
forecasting becomes a more systematic empirical tool in the 
current research on countries’ strategic decisions. Similarly, 
and against this background, next to directly assessing the 
predictive power of some of the determinants of military 
spending, our research also sought to further develop the 
model by Nordhaus et al. (2012). The model that we identi-
fied as the new, alternative specification might consequently 
be used in future research as a baseline model against which 
to assess new variables of theoretical interest.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers, Anjali Dayal 
and the journal’s editor-in-chief, Erik Voeten, for useful com-
ments on an earlier version of this manuscript.
Data and replication information
For this project, we have relied on the data provided by Nordhaus et al. 
(2012) and used the statistical software packages Stata 13 and R for 
the estimations, figures and tables. All replication material is available 
in one zip-file from the authors upon publication of this article.
Supplementary Material
The replication file is available at: http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/
dv/researchandpolitics
Declaration of conflicting interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency 
in the public, commercial or not-for-profit sectors.
Notes
1. See Bove and Brauner (2011) for a discussion of the comparabil-
ity and the potential discrepancies between the two data sources.
2. See Nordhaus et al. (2012: 492f) for a more detailed descrip-
tion of how this variable is estimated.
3. The following countries drop out of the sample as a result: 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Comoros, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
4. In other words, we test an “unfair” setup as the lagged 
dependent variable has been the strongest predictor so far.
Table 3. Out-of-sample forecasting power – baseline model 
versus final model.
Specification Mean U Mean MSPE ∆U ∆MSPE
Baseline model 0.9675 0.0885 – –
Final model 0.9670 0.0884 −0.0005 −0.0001
Table 4. Prediction accuracy by country – top-five states.
Country Top-5 MSPE Country Top-5 U
Iceland 0.0002 Haiti 0.1759
Yemen People’s 
Rep.
0.0020 Botswana 0.3637
United Kingdom 0.0047 Iceland 0.3796
Italy 0.0050 United Arab Emirates 0.4564
Canada 0.0050 Yemen People’s Rep. 0.4885
Table 5. Prediction accuracy by country – worst-five states.
Country Worst-5 MSPE Country Worst-5 U
Lesotho 0.8213 Belgium 0.9467
Gambia 0.4001 Denmark 0.9386
Laos 0.3802 Somalia 0.9274
Peru 0.2578 Cameroon 0.9236
Zimbabwe 0.2210 United Kingdom 0.9230
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